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Abstract
Under income-di¤erentiated mortality, poverty measures reect not
only the "true" poverty, but, also, the interferences or noise caused by
the survival process at work. Such interferences lead to the Mortality
Paradox: the worse the survival conditions of the poor are, the lower the
measured poverty is. We examine several solutions to avoid that paradox.
We identify conditions under which the extension, by means of a ctitious
income, of lifetime income proles of the prematurely dead neutralizes
the noise due to di¤erential mortality. Then, to account not only for the
"missing" poor, but, also, for the "hidden" poverty (premature death), we
use, as a ctitious income, the welfare-neutral income, making indi¤erent
between life continuation and death. The robustness of poverty measures
to the extension technique is illustrated with regional Belgian data.
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In An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), Malthus emphasized that the
population is a social product, whose size adjusts to the prevalence of poverty
through two kinds of population "checks". On the birth side, poverty reduces
fertility through parental anticipations about future di¢ culties to raise children
(i.e. "preventive checks"). Moreover, poverty leads to premature deaths within
the low income classes (i.e. "positive checks").
Given the underdeveloped state of social statistics at Malthuss time, the
existence of population checks was more a conjecture than a scientic result.
However, in the recent years, empirical studies conrmed the existence of pos-
itive population checks, under the form of an increasing relationship between
income and life expectancy.1 On average, individuals with higher incomes have,
ceteris paribus, a longer life than individuals with lower incomes.2
Income-di¤erentiated mortality raises a twofold challenge for the measure-
ment of poverty. Actually, the two aspects of poverty measurement underlined
by Sen (1976) are a¤ected: on the one hand, the identication of the poor within
the population; on the other hand, the construction of an index aggregating and
weighting the information available on the identied poor.
Regarding the identication of the poor, income-di¤erentiated mortality
leads to a paradox. Poor persons tend to die, on average, earlier than non-poor
persons. Hence, usual poverty measures, which focus on living individuals, do
not count the "missing" poor, and, thus, reect not only the "true" poverty, but,
also, the interferences or noise due to income-di¤erentiated mortality. Those in-
terferences push towards a lower poverty estimate. As a consequence, poverty
measures tend to underestimate the "true" poverty.3 That problem can be
called the Mortality Paradox: the worse the survival conditions faced by the
poor are, the lower the measured poverty is. That result is paradoxical, since
poverty measures should be increasing - or, at least, non-decreasing - in the
premature mortality faced by the poor due to their low income.
Income-di¤erentiated mortality raises also an important challenge regarding
the treatment of the informational basis relevant for the measurement of poverty.
Undoubtedly, a shorter life is a major source of deprivation. Hence, if individuals
with lower incomes face also a higher mortality, it is hard to ignore this when
measuring poverty. But if one takes premature death as a part of the poverty
phenomenon to be measured, then a major issue concerns the weighting of the
two dimensions under study: income and longevity.
This paper focuses on the challenges raised by income-di¤erentiated mortal-
ity for the measurement of poverty, by re-examining the Mortality Paradox and
its solutions. For that purpose, we rst develop a 2-period model with income
mobility and income-di¤erentiated mortality, and study the conditions under
which head-count poverty ratios face the Mortality Paradox. We propose a so-
lution to it: the extension, by means of a ctitious income, of lifetime income
1The same cannot be said on the birth side, where the observed fertility transition has
inrmed the existence of preventive population checks. Indeed, to explain the fertility decline,
the substitution e¤ect related to the rise in productivity must have overcome the income e¤ect.
2See, among others, Duleep (1986), Deaton and Paxson (1998), Deaton (2003), Jusot
(2003) and Salm (2007). One exception is Snyder and Evans (2006), who show that high
income groups face, ceteris paribus, a higher mortality than low-income groups.
3This problem is general, and concerns all poverty measures, including the recent multidi-
mensional poverty indexes (see infra ).
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proles of the prematurely dead. Then, we argue that a natural candidate for
the ctitious income is the welfare-neutral income, i.e. the income making an
agent indi¤erent between further life with that income and death. Finally, we
use Belgian data to estimate the bias induced by the Mortality Paradox, and
to evaluate the robustness of adjusted poverty measures to the extension of in-
come proles. This allows us to decompose the adjustment into counting the
"missing" persons and valuing premature death as a part of poverty.
As far as we know, there exists only one paper, by Kanbur and Mukherjee
(2007), which highlighted the existence of the Mortality Paradox. Using a broad
class of poverty measures (including, among other measures, head-count ratios),
Kanbur and Mukherjee showed that standard poverty indicators face serious bi-
ases under income-di¤erentiated mortality. Income-di¤erentiated mortality acts
as a selection mechanism, which selects proportionally fewer poor persons than
non-poor persons, making standard poverty measures reect not only poverty,
but, also, the noise or interferences induced by the selection process at work.
Kanbur and Mukherjee also proposed a solution to the Mortality Paradox. They
recommend, when computing poverty measures, to count the prematurely dead
poor persons as if they were still alive, and to truncate their lifetime income
proles by means of a ctitious income depending on past incomes. Such a gen-
eral remedy can be used to adjust or correct standard poverty measures: this
amounts to adjust the distribution of income, in such a way as to count the
"missing poor" persons as well, even though their premature death made them
disappear from (unadjusted) distributions.
Our paper complements that contribution on three grounds. Firstly, whereas
Kanbur and Mukherjee propose general rules for the selection of a ctitious in-
come, we argue, on the contrary, that the ctitious income should be equal
to a particular level: the welfare-neutral income. Secondly, while Kanbur and
Mukherjee only truncate the income proles among the poor population, we pro-
pose to do it for all "missing" persons. Thirdly, whereas Kanbur and Mukher-
jees paper is purely theoretical, we provide empirical estimates of size of the
bias induced by the Mortality Paradox, as well as an empirical study of the
robustness of adjusted poverty measures to the extension technique used.
At this early stage of our study, three remarks should be made. First, there
exist various circumstances where one can talk of "missing" individuals. A
well-known case is the one of missing women in countries where parents get
rid of their daughters through abortion or infanticide (Sen 1998). Another
well-documented case is the one of missing cohorts in case of war, famine or
epidemic. The case studied in this paper - missing elderly individuals due to
income-di¤erentiated mortality - is thus one case among many others. In all
those cases, it would be interesting to carry out some thought experiment, to
characterize the hypothetical world in which all those missing persons would be
alive. This is what we do in this paper, where we study what old-age poverty
measures become once the missing elderly are taken into account.
Second, although the theoretical part of this paper focuses, for the sake of
simplicity, on head-count poverty measures, the measurement bias induced by
income-di¤erentiated mortality is quite general, and is faced by many standard
poverty measures, as stressed by Kanbur and Mukherjee (2007). This is the rea-
son why, when estimating the size of the measurement bias in the empirical part,
we also provide estimates of the Foster Greer Thorbecke (1984) (FGT) poverty
measure, with and without the inclusion of the prematurely dead persons.
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Third, it should also be stressed that the measurement problem that we
consider here concerns also multidimensional poverty measures taking life ex-
pectancy statistics into account. The reason is the following. All poverty mea-
sures, including the multidimensional ones, are concerned with the assignment
of some number to a situation characterized by a particular distribution of at-
tributes among a population (e.g. income, longevity, etc.). Hence, the denition
of the relevant population - whether it includes the prematurely dead persons
or not - is a general issue, which concerns all poverty measures.4 Given that the
measurement problem does not come from the dimensions taken into account,
but from the denition of the population to be studied, multidimensional mea-
sures taking longevity into account do not avoid the Mortality Paradox.5
Anticipating on our results, we rst show how, under income-di¤erentiated
mortality, standard old-age poverty rates are subject to the Mortality Paradox.
We show that, when a ctitious income lower than the poverty line is assigned
to prematurely dead poor individuals only, the adjusted poverty rate exhibits
some form of independence with respect to variations in survival conditions.
Then, we consider the construction of alternative adjusted poverty measures,
which count a premature death as an aspect of deprivation and poverty. Such
measures, instead of being invariant to a worsening of survival conditions, are
increasing with the strength of positive population checks. That alternative
solution to the Mortality Paradox consists of assigning, to all prematurely dead
persons, a ctitious income equal to the welfare-neutral income. Finally, we
show, on the basis of Belgian regional data, that, while the addition of the
"missing" persons with ctitious incomes equal to the incomes when being alive
only raises the poverty rates by about one point, the assignment of a ctitious
income equal to the welfare-neutral income raises poverty rates by 6-7 points.
Taking the "hidden" burden of premature death into account is a much bigger
correction than merely counting the "missing" poor. Moreover, when comparing
FGT poverty measures with and without the addition of "missing" persons, we
observe that the correction leads to a signicant rise in the measured poverty,
which is, here again, strongly sensitive to the ctitious income assigned to the
prematurely dead, even more than under standard head-count poverty measures.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies the measurement of
poverty in a model with income mobility and income-di¤erentiated mortality,
and identies conditions under which truncating income proles of the prema-
turely dead prevents the Mortality Paradox. Section 3 explores a particular
extension, which relies on the welfare-neutral income. Section 4 illustrates, on
the basis of regional Belgian data, the Mortality Paradox and the robustness of
poverty measures to the extension method. Section 5 concludes.
4For instance, the Human Poverty Index (UNDP 1997), which includes, as dimensions, the
probability of not surviving to ages 40 or 60, faces the Mortality Paradox, since poor persons
who survive until 60 years and then die will not be counted as poor after their death, so that
a poverty-related death reduces the poverty measure.
5To illustrate this, let us take the example of a deprivation index taking income and life
expectancy into account. Suppose that a famine occurs. This implies an immediate reduction
of life expectancy and a rise in the deprivation index. However, income and life expectancy
statistics will, in the following years, reect the living conditions among a subgroup of the
initial population, i.e. the ones who survived despite the famine, and who su¤er from less
deprivation. Hence, the deprivation index reects not only the actual deprivation phenomenon,
but, also, the selection induced by the famine. The problem raised by the "missing" persons
cannot be solved merely by taking additional dimensions into account, since the problem lies
in the denition of the population for which one would like to measure deprivation.
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2 Poverty measure and income-based mortality
2.1 The framework
Let us consider a two-period model, where a cohort, of size N 2 N, lives the
young age (rst period) for sure, whereas only some fraction of the population
will enjoy the old age (second period).6
There exists a nite number K 2 N of possible income levels (K > 1). The
set of possible income levels is: Y = fy1; :::; yKg. For the ease of presentation,
we assume that income levels are indexed in an increasing order, so that:
y1 < ::: < yK (1)
The number of young individuals with income yi 2 Y is denoted by n1i .7 We
denote by n1 the vector of size K, whose entries are n1k for k = 1; :::;K.
The probability of survival to the old age, denoted by , depends on the
income when being young. Following the literature, we assume that a higher in-
come when being young leads to higher survival chances.8 Hence income-specic
survival probabilities, which take K distinct values, are ranked as follows:
1 < ::: < K (2)
We denote by  the vector of size K whose entries are the income-specic sur-
vival probabilities k, for k = 1; :::;K. The number of surviving old individuals
with income yi 2 Y is denoted by n2i .9 We denote by n2 the vector of size K,
whose entries are n2k for k = 1; :::;K.
Denoting by ij the probability that a young agent with income yi enjoys,
in case of survival, an income yj at the old age, the income mobility can be
described, conditionally on survival, by the right stochastic matrix :
 =
0BB@
11 12 ::: 1K
21 22 ::: 2K
::: ::: ::: :::
K1 K2 ::: KK
1CCA (3)
The income mobility matrix  concerns individuals who live the two periods.
As such, this does not take premature death into account, and, thus, leads to
an incomplete representation of the dynamics of income distribution.
Actually, the dynamics of income distribution can be represented by means
of the transition matrix M, of size K  K, which describes how the income
distribution at the young age determines the income distribution at the old age:
n2 =M0n1 (4)
The transition matrix M is:
M =
0BB@
111 112 ::: 11K
221 222 ::: 22K
::: ::: ::: :::
KK1 KK2 ::: KKK
1CCA (5)
6Our argument is robust to the number of life-periods. We focus here on a two-period
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The M matrix fully describes the trajectories of individuals in our econ-
omy. The lifecycle trajectory depends on survival probabilities and on income
transition probabilities, which are correlated in terms of rank. We can easily de-
compose the matrixM into its two components: the income mobility component
and the survival process component:
M =   (6)
where     10K, 1K being the identity vector of size K, while the symbol 
refers to the Hadamard product, that is, the entrywise product of two matrices.
The M matrix includes, as a special case, the situation where there is no
premature death (i.e. i = 1 for all i). In that case, the matrix M reduces to
the income mobility matrix . Alternatively, if there is no mobility over the
lifecycle (i.e. ii = 1 for all i), the matrixM is a diagonal matrix with survival
probabilities i as entries.
2.2 The Mortality Paradox
The Mortality Paradox is a general problem faced by various types of poverty
measures. It refers to an undesirable sensitivity of poverty measures to income-
di¤erentiated mortality. That paradox can be stated as follows: the worse the
survival conditions faced by the poor are, the lower the measured poverty is.
The origin of that paradox has to do with the selection mechanism that is
at work under income-di¤erentiated mortality. Survival laws act as a selection
process: poor individuals die, on average, earlier than non-poor persons. This
implies that poor persons become, with the mere passage of time, relatively
less numerous than non-poor persons, yielding a lower measured poverty. That
result is paradoxical, since the measured poverty should not decrease because of
the mere existence of positive population checks. Actually, income-di¤erentiated
mortality can be regarded as creating some interferences or a noise preventing
the measurement of the "true" poverty.
To illustrate the Mortality Paradox, let us focus on the simplest measures of
poverty, i.e. head-count ratios, which measure poverty by counting the number
of individuals whose incomes are below a (xed) poverty threshold yP 2 Y .
Denition 1 Assume an economy with income distribution ni at age i = 1; 2.









The old-age poverty rate P 2 is subject to the Mortality Paradox. To see this,





who are poor at the young age survive to the old age with positive probabilities
0 < k < 1 for k < P , and there is no income mobility (i.e. jj = 1 for all
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age do not survive to the old age: 0k = 0 for k < P , and there is no income























we obtain the following two measures of poverty, denoted by P 2 for the rst






















The old-age poverty rate is larger in the rst situation than in the second one.
The lower level of measured poverty at the old age in the second situation is the
mere outcome of income-di¤erentiated mortality. The strong positive population
checks at work in the second situation have made old-age poverty - apparently
- disappear.
The fact that a more severe income-based mortality reduces the measured
poverty is paradoxical. Poverty indexes should show us the extent of poverty,
and not be disturbed by the noise due to income-based mortality. Hence the
Mortality Paradox invites a renement of poverty measures.
To avoid that paradox, one solution consists of imposing that poverty mea-
sures exhibit some independence with respect to survival conditions. The follow-
ing property, entitled Robustness to Mortality Changes, captures that intuition.
Condition 1 (Robustness to Mortality Changes) A poverty measure P i
satises Robustness to Mortality Changes (RMC) if and only if a deterioration





k for some k  K
k = 0k for other k  K
, then P i = P i0:
RMC requires poverty measures to be invariant to a deterioration of survival
conditions. That property requires to observe the impact of changes in mortality
on poverty measures. A weaker independence requirement is the following.
Condition 2 (No Mobility Same Poverty) A poverty measure P i satises
No Mobility Same Poverty (NMSP) if and only if, in the absence of income
mobility, the measured poverty is constant across the lifecycle:
If jj = 1 for all j, then P i = P i+1:
NMSP states that, if we consider an economy without income mobility, the
poverty rate should be constant across the lifecycle. NMSP is simpler than
RMC, since it focuses on the basic case of no income mobility. However, despite
its simplicity, NMSP is useful, since it has a simple logical relationship with
RMC, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 1  RMC =) NMSP.
 NMSP + No income mobility =) RMC.
Proof. See the Appendix.
RMC and NMSP conditions are not equivalent. It is only in the absence
of income mobility that a strict equivalence holds. In some sense, NMSP is a
weaker requirement than RMC, since it is a weaker way to formalize the idea
of independence of poverty measures from survival conditions.
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Lemma 1 will allow us, when studying whether a poverty measure satises
RMC or not, to focus on the hypothetical case where there is no income mobility,
and to check whether NMSP is satised or not. If the poverty rate is not, in
the absence of mobility, constant along the lifecycle, this implies that RMC is
violated.
As it is shown below, the old-age poverty rate P 2 does not satisfy RMC, and
is thus subject to the interferences induced by income-di¤erentiated mortality.
Proposition 1 P 2 does not satisfy NMSP, since P 1 > P 2 without income
mobility.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Hence, as a consequence of Lemma 1, we know that the old-age poverty rate
violates also RMC, and, thus, is not robust to a deterioration of the survival
conditions faced by the poor. The old-age poverty rate P 2 is thus subject to
the Mortality Paradox.
2.3 A general solution to the Mortality Paradox
The reason why poverty measures su¤er from the Mortality Paradox has to
do with the fact that, once dead, poor persons disappear from the population.
Therefore, as suggested by Kanbur and Mukherjee (2007), a solution to the
Mortality Paradox comes from the extension of lifetime income proles, to take
into account the persons subject to premature mortality.
The underlying idea is the following. Instead of computing old-age poverty
measures on the basis of the surviving persons only, one should do as if all
individuals are still alive at the old age, and benet from some income. For that
purpose, lifetime income proles must be extended, to assign some income to
prematurely dead persons.
The assignment of a ctitious income to the premature dead implies that we
have now two, instead of one, income transition matrices: one for individuals
who survived to the old age, i.e. , and one for those who did not survive. We
will denote that latter income transition matrix by , of size K K:
 =
0BB@
11 ::: ::: 1K
::: ::: ::: :::
::: ::: ::: :::
K1 ::: ::: KK
1CCA (8)
where ij is the probability, for an individual with income yi when being young,
to have a ctitious income ei = yj assigned to him when he is dead.




















The rst term of the numerator is standard: it counts the poor individuals
among the old (surviving) population. But the second term is less standard: it
counts the poor individuals among those who did not survive, their ctitious
incomes being assigned to them through the matrix .
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The adjusted poverty rate P^ 2 can take distinct forms, depending on: (1)
whether the assignment of ctitious incomes concerns all individuals or only the
initially poor; (2) whether ctitious incomes exceed or are below the poverty
line yP . Those two features of the extension are captured by the matrix .10
The next proposition examines the conditions on  under which P^ 2 avoids
the Mortality Paradox. As above, we rely here on NMSP since we know, by
Lemma 1, that a violation of that property leads to a violation of RMC.11
Proposition 2 I: A ctitious income ei is assigned to the dead poor only.
- Ia: If ei < yP for all i, P^ 2 satises NMSP: P^ 2 = P 1.
- Ib: If ei < yP for i < R  P and ei  yP for i  R, P^ 2 does not satisfy
NMSP: P^ 2 < P 1.
- Ic: If ei  yP for all i, P^ 2 does not satisfy NMSP: P^ 2 < P 1.
II: A ctitious income ei is assigned to all dead individuals.
- IIa: If ei < yP for all i, P^ 2 does not satisfy NMSP: P^ 2 > P 1.
- IIb: If ei < yP for i < R  P and ei  yP for i  R, P^ 2 does not satisfy
NMSP: P^ 2 ? P 1.
- IIc: If ei  yP for all i, P^ 2 does not satisfy NMSP: P^ 2 < P 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
When ctitious incomes are assigned only to the prematurely dead poor
persons, and when all ctitious incomes are lower than the poverty line, P^ 2
satises NMSP, and, thus, satises some weak form of independence with respect
to survival conditions. In all cases except Ia, the NMSP is violated, implying,
by Lemma 1, a violation of RMC. Two kinds of sensitivity can arise, and these
do not have the same relationship with the Mortality Paradox.
On the one hand, if the ctitious income exceeds the poverty threshold (i.e.
cases Ib, Ic, IIc), the old-age poverty rate does not satisfy RMC, and is subject
to the Mortality Paradox. In that case, P^ 2 is, despite the adjustment, lower than
P 1, since only a subgroup of the prematurely dead poor persons are counted as
poor in the adjusted measure.
On the other hand, if ctitious incomes are assigned to all prematurely dead
persons (i.e. cases IIa), P^ 2 is not invariant to mortality changes. P^ 2 is then
higher than the poverty rate at the young age, because we count all prematurely
dead persons as poor. Hence the Mortality Paradox does not hold here. It is
quite the opposite, since P^ 2 does not only count the "missing" poor, but counts
also premature death as a part of the poverty phenomenon to be measured.12
Finally, let us notice a special case where the two reasons why P^ 2 violates
NMSP go in opposite directions. It can be shown that, under particular cir-
cumstances, those reasons cancel each other, making P^ 2 satisfy NMSP.13
10The level of the ctitious income (i.e. point (2)) depends on the entries of the  matrix,
whereas the subset of prematurely dead to which some ctious income is assigned is captured
by the size of . For instance, assignment only to the dead poor yields  of size (P   1) 
(P   1), against a size K K for an assignment for the whole prematurely dead population.
11We assume, for the simplicity of presentation, that the poverty line yP is invariant to the
adjustment. Alternatively, if one considers a relativistic view of poverty, it could be argued
that the adjustment a¤ects also the poverty line. Given that this second-order e¤ect depends
on the precise way in which the poverty line is computed, we leave that discussion to the
empirical example of Section 4.
12We will come back on that extension - and its justications - below.
13That special case includes the situation where the matrix assigning ctitious incomes, i.e.
9
Corollary 1 When (1) a ctitious income is assigned to all prematurely dead
persons; (2) the ctitious income is inferior to yP for all short-lived poor individ-
uals, and is superior to yP for all short-lived non-poor individuals, P^ 2 satises
NMSP. That case coincides with case IIb with R = P .
Proof. See the Appendix.
In sum, this section shows that it is possible to achieve some weak inde-
pendence with respect to survival conditions - under the form of NMSP - by
extending the lifetime income proles of the prematurely dead. That extension
can be done in various ways, but it should concern either only the prematurely
dead poor individuals, with ctitious incomes below the poverty threshold, or
every prematurely dead, but with ctitious incomes below the poverty line only
for prematurely dead poor individuals. Otherwise, NMSP is violated.
Finally, it should be stressed here that the solution proposed by Kanbur and
Mukherjee (2007), when applied to simple head-count poverty ratios, satises
NMSP, since it coincides with case Ia in Proposition 2. The NMSP property cap-
tures some aspect of independence of poverty measures with respect to survival
conditions. However, as stated in Lemma 1, NMSP does not guarantee, in a
general context with income mobility, RMC. Hence, if one focuses on head-count
poverty measures, Kanbur and Mukherjees solution to the Mortality Paradox
leads to RMC only if there is no income mobility, but not otherwise.
3 The extension of income proles revisited
The previous section identied conditions under which truncating income pro-
les of the dead makes standard (head-count ratio) poverty measures avoid the
Mortality Paradox. That solution, although appealing, faces some criticisms,
which concern both the selection and meaningfulness of the ctitious incomes
used in the extension.
A rst criticism is that, even if one sticks to the extension described above,
there exist not a single, but numerous ways to truncate the lifetime income
proles of the prematurely dead. The problem is that the resulting poverty es-
timates are likely to be strongly sensitive to the chosen ctitious income ei. The
closer ei is to yP , the lower the measured poverty is. Hence, the measurement
of poverty in real environments requires more precise information.14
A second criticism concerns the extent to which premature mortality per se
matters for poverty measurement. Once lifetime income proles are extended,
the ctitious income enters the poverty measure as if it was an income enjoyed













It is easy to check that this adjusted poverty rate satises No Mobility Same Poverty.
14That critique applies not only to the extension discussed above, but, also, to what was
proposed by Kanbur and Mukherjee (2007). According to them, the ctitious income has to
satisfy three properties: (1) it is increasing in the past income (i.e. yi > yi 1 =) ei > ei 1);
(2) it cannot exceed the past income (i.e. ei  yi); (3) agents who are not poor when being
alive should not be counted as poor after the extension (i.e. ei  yP when yi > yP ). Those
conditions imply that the poverty measure falls under case Ia, and escapes from the Mortality
Paradox. However, those conditions are too general for measurement exercises.
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by a living person. This amounts to regard as equivalent two situations that
are quite di¤erent: on the one hand, being alive with some income yi, and, on
the other hand, being dead with a ctitious income ei equal to yi. Hence the
extension of lifetime income proles has a double e¤ect. This does not only
allow to count some - otherwise missing - poor in the measure of poverty. The
extension assigns also some weights to two dimensions of poverty (income and
longevity). Such a weighting exercise cannot remain implicit, but should have
some explicit (welfare) foundations.
Those two criticisms invite a method to select a particular ctitious income,
and to solve the trade-o¤s, in terms of poverty measurement, between low in-
comes and short lives. This is the task of the present section.
3.1 A welfare-neutral ctitious income
To overcome those two criticisms, we propose here to carry out the computation
of ctitious incomes on the basis of individual preferences on lifetime income
proles. More precisely, we propose to solve those problems by selecting a
particular ctitious income: the welfare-neutral income. This is dened as the
hypothetical income that would make an individual indi¤erent between, on the
one hand, further life with that income, and, on the other hand, death.
The reliance on individual preferences requires some justications. Actually,
the Mortality Paradox is a paradox only to the extent that premature death
is a part of the poverty phenomenon to be measured. If premature death had
nothing to do with poverty, then there would be nothing paradoxical in having
poverty measures decreasing once survival conditions deteriorate. But the will
to overcome the Mortality Paradox pushes us de facto in the eld of multidimen-
sional poverty measurement. Hence, it is hard to ignore individual preferences
as providing an adequate informational basis for weighting the two dimensions
of poverty (income and longevity). Indeed, if the level of the ctitious income
contributes to assign a specic "weight" reecting the contribution of premature
death to poverty, then using individual preferences is the natural way to solve
that weighting exercise.
To dene that welfare-neutral income, let us assume that individuals have
well-dened preferences over all possible lifetime income proles, and that those




where uti is the value assigned by a state-dependent temporal utility function at
period t under temporal income yi:
uti =

u(yi) if the individual is alive at that period

 if the individual is not alive at that period
(11)
where u() is increasing, while 
 is the utility of being dead.16
Assuming the existence of a well-dened preference ordering on all possible
lifetime income proles (including proles with di¤erent lengths) may seem, at
rst glance, to be a strong assumption. Note, however, that one can interpret
15For the sake of simplicity, we assume that preferences are uniform.
16That number is, in most applications, set to zero (see Becker et al 2005).
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those preferences as preferences over a particular subset of all possible lotteries
of life, subset which only includes degenerate lotteries of life, i.e. lotteries with
one certain lifetime income prole.17 In the light of this, our assumption is in
line with what is generally done in economics. Actually, assuming well-dened
preferences on lotteries of life is a usual practice in the empirical literature on
the value of a statistical life (Viscusi 1998), and, also, in the literature on the
evaluation of mortality risk reduction (Usher 1980, Becker et al 2005).18
On the basis of that, one can dene the "welfare-neutral" income as follows.
Denition 2 For an individual with income yi 2 Y , the welfare-neutral income
yi is the hypothetical income that makes him indi¤erent between life continuation
with that income and death:
U (u(yi);
) = U (u(yi); u(yi))
Note that whether the welfare-neutral income yi is higher or lower than the
income when alive yi is an open issue. The answer depends on the individuals
preferences (i.e. the shape of the functions U() and u ()), and on the income
yi enjoyed at the young age.
Having dened the welfare-neutral income yi, let us now explain why it is
a plausible candidate for the extension of lifetime income proles of the pre-
maturely dead. For that purpose, we will show how the welfare-neutral income
provides a solution to the two criticisms formulated above, by considering the
welfare consequences of the extension of lifetime income proles.
Actually, when one truncates an agents income prole (yi; 0) with a ctitious
income ei, this amounts to do as if that person was still alive during that period,
and enjoyed an income ei. Thus, the hypothetical situation after extension can
be better or worse than the actual situation depending on whether:
U(u(yi);
) 7 U(u(yi); u(ei)) (12)
If the RHS exceeds the LHS, the person would have preferred living one more
period with the ctitious income rather than dying after the young age. If the
LHS exceeds the RHS, the person thinks that his actual life is better than the
same life with the addition of one period with income ei. In the former case, the
extension of the income prole amounts to do as if the person had enjoyed a
better life than the one he actually enjoyed. In the latter case, it is the opposite.
But in any case, the extension disconnects the measurement of poverty from the
measurement of welfare, which is problematic.
To illustrate this, let us compare three cases.
 Case A: an individual with income yi < yP dies after period 1, and no
extension is made in the poverty measure.
 Case B: an individual with income yi < yP dies after period 1, but his
income prole is extended by means of the income ~ei < yP such that:
U(u(yi);
) < U(u(yi); u(~ei))
17On that particular point, see Fleurbaey et al (2011).
18Having stressed this, it remains that assuming well-dened preferences on lives of di¤erent
lengths is, from a philosophical perspective, far from trivial. Actually, it could be argued that
mans capacity to evaluate a world where he / she is absent, in comparison to a world where
he / she is present may be quite limited. On the di¢ culties involved by such comparisons, see
Part (1984).
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 Case C: an individual with income yi < yP dies at the end of period 2,
and enjoys the income yj = ~ei < yP at the old age.
The measured poverty is lower in Case A than in Case B. The measured
poverty is also lower in Case A than in Case C, since Case C is equivalent to
Case B for the measurement of poverty. Hence we have: P 2A < P 2B = P 2C .
In welfare terms, Cases A and B are equivalent, since these di¤er only in how
poverty is measured, and are exactly the same otherwise. Case C dominates
the other cases in welfare terms (because of the above inequality). Thus we
have: UA = UB < UC . Hence, the death of the individual, i.e. the passage
from C to B, reduces his welfare, but does not change the measured poverty.
This is quite problematic. Clearly, if a society undergoes an epidemy, so that
many individuals shift from Case C to Case B, it is hard to claim, despite the
fall in social welfare, that poverty is, at the end, the same as if the epidemic
had not occurred. Such a claim is surely subject to the Mortality Paradox.
The constancy of the measured poverty despite a change in living conditions is
acceptable only if that change is welfare-neutral.
Actually, there exists only one level of the ctitious income ei that avoids
that problem. It is the "welfare-neutral" income yi. It is easy to see that, when
ei = yi, there is no discrepancy between poverty measurement and welfare
measurement. Indeed, if we now assume ei = yi, we still get that poverty is
larger under Cases B and C than under Case A, i.e. PA < PB = PC . In welfare
terms, we have that Cases A and B are still equivalent (since the only change
concerns how poverty is measured), but that welfare in Case C is also equal to
what it is in Case B, since, by denition, survival with the ctitious income does
not constitute a welfare improvement. Hence we have: UA = UB = UC .
Thus, poverty is the same in B and C, and welfare too. Here there is nothing
shocking in having a constant poverty measure despite the occurrence of an
event such as an epidemic, since that event is here welfare-neutral, unlike what
prevailed above. Here the comparison of Cases B and C consists of comparing
the emergence of an epidemic with its avoidance at the cost of extreme misery
(leading individuals to indi¤erence between life and death). Those two situations
are equivalent in terms of poverty, and the Mortality Paradox does not arise.
In sum, the use of the welfare-neutral income as a ctitious income allows
us to base the extension on a specic ctitious income, as well as to avoid
a discrepancy between the measurement of poverty and the measurement of
welfare. As such, this brings an appealing solution to the Mortality Paradox.
3.2 A specic case: time-additive welfare
The "welfare-neutral" ctitious income yi depends on the postulated prefer-
ences, which can take various forms. However, under standard time-additive
lifetime welfare, the welfare-neutral income yi has two convenient properties.
On the one hand, it is unique; on the other hand, it is independent from past
income.
To see this, let us assume that lifetime welfare takes a time-additive form:
U(u1i ; u
2





where  is a time preference factor (0 <  < 1). Then, if the utility of death is
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normalized to zero (i.e. 
 = 0), we have
U(u1i ; 0) = u
1
i + 0 = u(yi) (14)
Hence, the welfare-neutral income yi, is implicitly dened by:
u(yi) = 0 (15)
An additional life-period with income larger than yi is worth being lived, whereas
a life-period with income lower than yi is not. Under that specication, the
ctitious income yi is such that temporal welfare is zero, that is, equivalent
to the temporal welfare associated to death. Thus, in that case, the welfare-
neutral income yi is the same for all past income levels. In the rest of this
section, we will denote it by yN . As a consequence, it appears that, under
standard time-additive lifetime utility, the welfare-neutral income level is unique
and independent from past incomes. Note that those properties may not hold
under alternative, less standard, preferences.19
3.3 Properties of the new adjusted poverty measure
Let us now study whether adjusted poverty measures based on welfare-neutral
ctitious incomes are robust to changes in survival conditions. Remind that the
adjusted old-age poverty rate P^ 2 is now computed by assigning a single value -
i.e. the welfare-neutral ctitious income - for the second-period income for all
prematurely dead individuals.
As explained above, whether the welfare-neutral ctitious income lies above
or below the past income when alive depends on individual preferences, and on
the past income level. Therefore the transition matrix  can take various forms.
Note, however, that, in the case of time-additive lifetime welfare, the welfare-
neutral income takes a single value, denoted by yN , which is independent from
past incomes. Hence  takes a simple form, where ij = 0 for j 6= N and




























if yN  yP
In the former case, the prematurely dead persons are all counted as poor. In the
latter case, they all disappear from the poverty measure. The interpretation of
those two cases is as follows. When yN < yP , an individual enjoying an income
19To see this, take the following forms, which only regard either the worst or the best period
lived (see Broome 2004, p. 228):
U(u1i ; u
2














Under the min specication, yi is such that u(yi)  u1i , which implies yi  yi, but does not
allow us to say more. On the contrary, under the max specication, we have yi  yi. Thus
the uniqueness and the independence of the welfare-neutral income from past income are not
general properties, but only nice corollaries of standard time-additive lifetime welfare.
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equal to the poverty line still prefers that life to death, whereas, when yN  yP ,
the poverty threshold is lower than the welfare-neutral income level, revealing
that the misery makes life not worth being lived.
To identify the conditions under which the so-constructed adjusted poverty
measure P^ 2 is subject to the Mortality Paradox, we will, as above, examine
whether P^ 2 satises NMSP, since it is a simple way to see whether P^ 2 is robust
to changes in survival conditions.
Proposition 3 Consider an economy with time-additive lifetime welfare.
 Under yN < yP , P^ 2 does not satisfy NMSP: P^ 2 > P 1.
 Under yN  yP , P^ 2 does not satisfy NMSP: P^ 2 < P 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, once the ctitious income takes its welfare-neutral level and is assigned
to all prematurely dead individuals, P^ 2 does not satisfy NMSP, and, by Lemma
1, also violates RMC. That lack of robustness occurs, since the extension based
on the welfare-neutral ctitious income amounts to count early deaths as a
source of the poverty phenomenon to be measured. The sensitivity of adjusted
poverty measure to survival conditions has two meanings.
When yN lies below the poverty threshold yP , all premature deaths are
regarded as a source of poverty, and this explains why P^ 2 is sensitive to a de-
terioration of survival conditions. Thus, adjusted poverty measures, instead of
being invariant to changes in income-based mortality, take di¤erential mortal-
ity into account, in the opposite way as standard poverty measures do. This
explains why P^ 2 violates the RMC in that case.
If, on the contrary, the welfare-neutral income level exceeds the poverty
threshold, the adjusted poverty measure at the old age is lower than the poverty
measure at the young age. The intuition is that, in that case, life is not worth
being lived for all poor persons. As a consequence, in that context, prema-
ture death cannot be counted as something causing poverty, and the Mortality
Paradox is hardly relevant under those circumstances.
In sum, this Section proposed to overcome the Mortality Paradox by trun-
cating lifetime income proles of the prematurely dead by means of the welfare-
neutral income. The use of the welfare-neutral income as a ctitious income
can be defended on two grounds. First, the computation of an income that
yields indi¤erence between life and death leads, under standard preferences, to
a unique value for the ctitious income. Such a uniqueness is most welcome
when we consider the empirical measurement of poverty, which is strongly sen-
sitive to the ctitious income (see below). Second, the so-computed ctitious
income can also, thanks to its welfarist foundations, sort out trade-o¤s between
income and longevity. As such, this adjustment of poverty measures does more
than counting the "missing" individuals; it also takes into account a "hidden" -
but central - part of the poverty phenomenon to be measured: premature death.
4 Old-age poverty in Belgian regions
Let us now illustrate the downward bias due to the Mortality Paradox, and
the sensitivity of adjusted old-age poverty measures to the extension of income
proles. For those purposes, we will use data from Belgium and its regions.
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4.1 The data
We use raw poverty measures coming from the European household survey EU-
SILC for the year 2006 (EU, 2006). Regarding longevity data, the empirical
study of the Mortality Paradox ideally requires lifetables di¤erentiated according
to income groups. Such lifetables are not available, but these are derived from
education-specic lifetables from Deboosere et al. (2009).20
Since the Mortality Paradox is about the e¤ect of di¤erentiated survival
conditions on poverty measurement, one can expect that measurement biases
induced by income-di¤erentiated mortality are more negligible at younger ages.
Therefore, to estimate the biases due to di¤erentiated mortality, we will focus
on the measurement of poverty in the population aged 60 or more. Table 1
presents the head-count poverty rates by region and by age groups in 2006.
Poverty is higher among those of age 60 and more than among the total
population. While the total poverty rate is 14.2 %, the proportion of poor
elderly is 20.8 %. There exist also large di¤erences between men and women.
Whatever the region and the age group are, poverty rates are larger among
women than among men. That gender poverty gap is particularly high above
the age of 60. Table 1 highlights also a big di¤erence between Flanders and
Wallonia. That gap is important among the younger generations, but tends to
vanish at older age, thanks to the (nationwide) pension system.
Table 1 also shows life expectancy di¤erentials between men and women,
and between Flanders and Wallonia. Whereas the gender gap in life expectancy
is well documented, the geographical gap is more surprising. Indeed, although
both regions are geographically close to each other, life expectancy at birth in
Wallonia is shorter than in Flanders, by about 2 years and a half.
Table 1 : Poverty and life expectancy in Belgium21
Belgium Flanders Wallonia
Poverty rate
Total population 14.2 % 11.5 % 16.0 %
Male 12.9 % 10.1 % 15.0 %
Female 15.4 % 12.9 % 16.9 %
60+ 20.8 % 20.2 % 20.4 %
Male 18.7 % 18.3 % 18.9 %
Female 22.4 % 21.9 % 21.6 %
Life expectancy
Total population 79.4 80.2 77.9
Male 76.5 77.6 74.6
Female 82.2 82.8 81.1
Besides gender and geographic location, another source of longevity inequal-
ity is the income. However, the impact of income on mortality is more di¢ cult
to observe, since there exist no income-specic lifetable. Hence, in order to de-
rive a relation between income and mortality, we use lifetables by educational
20See the Appendix.
21Those poverty rates are computed on the basis of the annual available equivalent income
calculated with OECD equivalence scales (see the Appendix). The poverty rate is the per-
centage of the population below the poverty threshold xed at 60% of the median income
(threshold=10236e).
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level, which are regularly published, and the correlations between education and
income, to extrapolate lifetables by income levels, for each region and gender.
While our calculations are presented in the Appendix, Figures 1 and 2 below
summarize our results by showing life expectancy at age 55-59 by income class,












































Figure 2 : Life expectancy at 55-59 by income class -
Female
Those gures invite several comments. First, there exists an increasing
monotonic relationship between income and life expectancy at age 55-59. That
relationship is robust to all genders and regions, and is signicant. For instance,
a Walloon man in the lowest income class has a life expectancy that is 4 years
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less than the one of a Walloon man of the highest income group. Second, the
income / longevity relationship is non-linear: it is between the second and the
sixth deciles that the slope is the largest. But at the two extremes of the income
distribution, the income / longevity relationship is less strong. Thirdly, the com-
parison of Figures 1 and 2 suggests that the income / longevity relationship is
signicantly stronger for men than for women.
In the light of Figures 1 and 2, one can expect that standard poverty mea-
sures at high ages are biased downwards. The reasons are twofold.
A rst reason has to do with the selection mechanism induced by income-
di¤erentiated mortality. Given that poor persons tend to live less long than non-
poor persons, the poverty rate among the surviving population at age 60 and
more reects not only the "true" poverty, but, also, the interferences associated
with the di¤erentiated survival process. That noise tends to reduce the apparent
poverty, by the mere absence of the "missing" poor. Hence the poverty rate
among Walloon males, equal to 20.4 %, tends, by being based on the population
surviving to age 60, to forget the "missing" poor, who faced worse survival
conditions than the average because of their poverty.
Besides that measurement problem - i.e. the Mortality Paradox -, one may
also argue that a premature death is a part of the poverty phenomenon to be
measured. Once it is acknowledged that a Walloon male of the lowest income
class lives, on average, 4 years less than one of the highest income class, why
should we restrict the measurement of poverty to the income dimension?
Those problems invite distinct adjustments of poverty measures. This sec-
tion compares adjusted old-age poverty measures obtained by truncating the
income proles of the prematurely dead, under various extension techniques.
4.2 General methodology
The adjustment of poverty measures includes two parts. First, the addition of
the "missing" poor; second, the imputation of a particular ctitious income.
Regarding the rst step, we use the following method. For each income class
i and region r = F;W , we have increased the population group Nir on the
basis of the largest life expectancy observed (i.e. the one of top income levels




where N^ir is the adjusted population group, Nir is the raw population group,
L100F is the life expectancy of the top income group in Flanders, and Lir is the
life expectancy for income group i in region r.
The above computation gives us a new distribution of the population in
terms of income, which is the income distribution in the hypothetical case where
all individuals had faced the same survival conditions as the ones of a group of
reference (top earnings in Flanders). That computation allows us to reintegrate,
in our calculations, the missing persons, equal, for each group, to N^ir  Nir.
Under such a computation, the ctitious income assigned to a prematurely
dead individual coincides with his past income. As we discussed above, that
extension technique, although attractive, is not the unique possible one. It is
indeed possible to reallocate the missing persons N^ir   Nir of each group i
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and region r to any income group, and, in particular, to the welfare-neutral
income group. Hence, in the following, we present adjusted poverty measures
under those two adjustment techniques.22 The rst extension technique (left
side of Figure 3), where missing persons are reallocated to the income group
corresponding to their income when being alive; the second extension technique
(right side of Figure 3), where all missing persons are reallocated to the welfare-
neutral income group yN .23





Income levels Income levels
Figure 3: Two alternative adjustments of the income
distribution
4.3 Results
Let us rst consider the simple case where the ctitious income ei used for the
extension is the one enjoyed when being alive, i.e. yi. For that purpose, we
will proceed in two stages. We will rst compute the poverty rate for age 60
and more for each gender and region, for the new population computed above,
while assuming that the poverty threshold takes the same level as before the
adjustment. Then, we will compute adjusted poverty rates under a new poverty
line (taking the modication of the income distribution into account).
Table 2 shows that, if one keeps the poverty threshold of Table 1, adjusted
poverty rates are larger than standard poverty rates. That result is not surpris-
ing: our correction, by adding the "missing" persons, consists in adding rela-
tively more poor individuals than non-poor individuals. Hence, under a xed
poverty threshold, there must be a rise in the poverty rate. That adjustment
is relatively constant across genders and regions, and equal to about 1 point.
Such an adjustment, which can be interpreted as the downward bias due to the
Mortality Paradox, may be regarded as either low or high. On the one hand,
when one considers poverty rates of about 20%, the addition of one point is a
minor adjustment. On the other hand, that adjustment looks signicant once
we think that 1 percent of the population under study consists of thousands of
persons and families.
22Throughout this section, the poverty rate is the percentage of the population below the
poverty line yP , xed to 60 % of the median income.
23On Figure 3, the income distribution is purely hypothetical, and only serves to illustrate
the two alternative ways to incorporate prematurely dead persons in the income distribution.
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Whereas the rst part of Table 2 is based on the pre-adjustment poverty
threshold, the modication of the population groups in such a way as to neu-
tralize the impact of di¤erential mortality has also the e¤ect of changing the
income distribution as a whole. Hence, if one adheres to a relativist - rather
than absolutist - view of poverty, the addition of "missing" individuals may also
a¤ect the level of the poverty threshold. If one computes that new threshold,
we obtain a poverty line that is 125 euros lower than the initial one. Under that
new threshold, poverty rates tend to fall to levels that are close (if not inferior)
to unadjusted poverty rates (second part of Table 2). Thus, if one adheres to
a relativist view of poverty, taking the "missing" individuals into account may
reduce - rather than raise - poverty.
Table 2: Adjusted poverty rates 60+: ctitious income = past income
Belgium Flanders Wallonia
Pre-adjustment poverty threshold (10236 euros)
Total population 21.7 % 21.1 % 21.3 %
Men 19.8 % 19.3 % 20.1 %
Women 23.3 % 22.7 % 22.3 %
New poverty threshold (10109 euros)
Total population 20.5 % 20.2 % 20.0 %
Men 18.7 % 18.3 % 18.4 %
Women 22.1 % 21.8 % 21.2 %
Therefore, whether counting the "missing" persons a¤ects the measured
poverty or not depends on whether we adhere to an absolutist or a relativistic
view of poverty. In the former case, adding the prematurely dead raises poverty.
In the latter case, the fall in the poverty threshold is such that the poverty rate
is close - if not lower - than before the adjustment. Those results raise the ques-
tion of the "right" poverty threshold. We will not address that general issue
here, and we will propose poverty measures under the two kinds of threshold.
Whereas Table 2 presupposed that the ctitious income equals the income
when being alive, one can consider other values for that ctitious income. As
discussed above, a natural candidate is the welfare-neutral income. To estimate
that welfare-neutral income, we use here the recent literature on the measure-
ment of welfare losses induced by premature death allows us to derive more
precise estimates of the welfare-neutral income. For that purpose, let us as-




1  1= + 
Following Becker et al. (2005), we x  = 1:25. We estimate the intercept 
on the basis of the average income in our database, and we obtain:  =  15:50.
On the basis of those estimates, we obtain a welfare-neutral income equal to
284 euros. Table 3 shows adjusted poverty rates under that ctitious income.
Adjusted poverty rates under the welfare-neutral ctitious income are larger
than under ctitious incomes equal to the income when being alive, and, also,
larger than unadjusted poverty measures. It is also important to decompose the
adjustment into (1) counting the "missing poor"; (2) counting premature death
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as a part of poverty. The rst adjustment explains the gap between poverty
rates in Tables 1 and 2. That change is small - about 1 point - and not robust
to the chosen poverty threshold. The second adjustment explains the poverty
di¤erentials between Tables 2 and 3. That di¤erential is large - about 6-7 points
- and quite robust to the chosen poverty threshold.
Another important observation to be made concerns the gender poverty gap.
In unadjusted terms, Walloon women are poorer than Walloon men (21.6 %
against 18.9 %). In adjusted terms, and taking past incomes as a basis for the
ctitious income, women are still more poor than men (22.3 % against 20.1
%). However, once we count premature death as a part of poverty, we obtain
the opposite ranking: Walloon men, because of their worse survival conditions,
turn out to be poorer than Walloon women (31.9 % against 29.4 %). Hence, the
choice of ctitious incomes is relevant not only for the description of aggregate
outcomes, but, also, for the description of poverty di¤erentials between groups.
Table 3: Adjusted poverty rates 60+: welfare-neutral ctitious income
Belgium Flanders Wallonia
Pre-adjustment poverty threshold (10236 euros)
Total population 29.0 % 27.5 % 30.6 %
Men 28.8 % 26.9 % 31.9 %
Women 29.1 % 27.9 % 29.4 %
New poverty threshold (10031 euros)
Total population 27.3 % 25.9 % 28.5 %
Men 27.2 % 25.5 % 29.6 %
Women 27.3 % 26.3 % 27.6 %
4.4 Further results: FGT poverty measures
Our empirical illustration has so far focused only on standard head-count ratios.
However, as stressed by Kanbur and Mukherjee (2007), the Mortality Paradox
leads to a measurement bias for a broad class of poverty measures, and not
only for head-count ratios. In order to investigate to what extent other poverty
measures, also su¤er from the noise induced by income-di¤erentiated mortality,
we propose here to carry out the same exercise as above, but while using, for











As it is well-known, the FGT measure with  = 0, i.e. P0, is the standard head-
count poverty ratio; when  = 1, the FGT measure, denoted by P1, consists of
the average of poverty gaps ratios, and, as such, captures also the depth of the
poverty phenomenon. When  = 2, the FGT measure, denoted by P2, is the
average of squared poverty gap ratios.
We will compare here standard, unadjusted FGT measures, with the ones
computed on the basis of the adjusted income distribution, as above. Table 4
below shows the unadjusted FGT poverty measures for the Belgian population
aged 60 and more. Table 4 shows that, although old-age poverty is, except for
females, larger in Wallonia than in Flanders on the basis of head-count ratios,
the same is no longer true once we consider poverty gap ratios or squared poverty
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gap ratios. That somewhat surprising result is probably due to the larger life
expectancy in Flanders (see above), which leads to a larger depth of poverty for
the elderly, in comparison to Wallonia.
Table 4: FGT poverty measures at age 60+ in Belgium
Belgium Flanders Wallonia
Head-count ratio (P0)
Total population 20.8 % 20.2 % 20.4 %
Male 18.7 % 18.3 % 18.9 %
Female 22.4 % 21.9 % 21.6 %
Poverty gap ratio (P1)
Total population 4.2 % 4.0 % 3.8 %
Male 3.6 % 3.5 % 3.4 %
Female 4.7 % 4.4 % 4.1 %
Squared poverty gap ratio (P2)
Total population 1.5 % 1.4 % 1.1 %
Male 1.2 % 1.1 % 1.0 %
Female 1.8 % 1.6 % 1.2 %
As shown by Table 5, which gives adjusted FGT measures under a ctitious
income equal to the past income when being alive, the size of the adjustment is
signicant when the poverty line remains unchanged: the overall P1 index for
Belgians aged 60+ grows from 4.2 % to 4.4 %, whereas the P2 index grows from
1.5 % to 1.6 %. Thus the inclusion of "missing" persons a¤ects not only the
counting of the poor, but, also the measured depth of poverty. Note that, as
with head-count ratios, the adjustment is less sizeable once the poverty line is
also adjusted to the new, extended population.
Finally, assigning a ctitious income equal to the welfare-neutral income
leads to much larger adjustments, as shown on Table 6. For the entire popu-
lation aged 60+, the average of poverty gaps P1 increases from 4.2 % without
adjustment to 13.9 % for the adjusted measure. The average of squared poverty
gaps P2 is raised from 1.5 % to 11.2 %. Those adjustments are much larger than
those under a ctitious income equal to past income. Moreover, those adjust-
ments are, in relative terms, more sizeable than when considering head-count
ratios (i.e. P0). This suggests that taking the prematurely dead into account
has an even larger impact on poverty measurement once the depth of poverty is
also measured. Thus the Mortality Paradox raises measurement di¢ culties for
a broad class of poverty measures, going far beyond standard head-count ratios.
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Table 5: Adjusted FGT measures at age 60+: ctitious income = past income
Belgium Flanders Wallonia
Pre-adjustment poverty threshold (10236 euros)
Total population P0 21.7 % 21.1 % 21.3 %
P1 4.4 % 4.2 % 4.0 %
P2 1.6 % 1.5 % 1.2 %
Male P0 19.8 % 19.3 % 20.1 %
P1 3.8 % 3.7 % 3.6 %
P2 1.3 % 1.2 % 1.1 %
Female P0 23.3 % 22.7 % 22.3 %
P1 4.9 % 4.5 % 4.3 %
P2 1.8 % 1.7 % 1.3 %
New poverty threshold (10109 euros)
Total population P0 20.5 % 20.2 % 20.0 %
P1 4.2 % 3.9 % 3.8 %
P2 1.5 % 1.4 % 1.1 %
Male P0 18.7 % 18.3 % 18.4 %
P1 3.7 % 3.5 % 3.5 %
P2 1.2 % 1.1 % 1.0 %
Female P0 22.1 % 21.8 % 21.2 %
P1 4.6 % 4.3 % 4.0 %
P2 1.8 % 1.6 % 1.2 %
Table 6: Adjusted FGT measures at age 60+: ctitious income = welfare-neutral income
Belgium Flanders Wallonia
Pre-adjustment poverty threshold (10236 euros)
Total population P0 29.0 % 27.5 % 30.6 %
P1 13.9 % 12.5 % 15.7 %
P2 11.2 % 9.9 % 13.0 %
Male P0 28.8 % 26.9 % 31.9 %
P1 15.3 % 13.4 % 18.5 %
P2 12.8 % 11.0 % 16.0 %
Female P0 29.1 % 27.9 % 29.4 %
P1 12.7 % 11.7 % 13.5 %
P2 9.8 % 8.9 % 10.6 %
New poverty threshold (10031 euros)
Total population P0 27.3 % 25.9 % 28.5 %
P1 13.6 % 12.2 % 15.4 %
P2 11.1 % 9.8 % 12.9 %
Male P0 27.2 % 25.5 % 29.6 %
P1 15.0 % 13.1 % 18.2 %
P2 12.7 % 10.9 % 15.9 %
Female P0 27.3 % 26.3 % 27.6 %
P1 12.4 % 11.3 % 13.2 %
P2 9.7 % 8.8 % 10.5 %
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5 Conclusions
Under income-di¤erentiated mortality, poverty measures reect not only the
"true" poverty, but, also, the interferences due to the survival process. That
dependency on survival laws leads to the Mortality Paradox: the worse the
survival conditions of the poor are, the lower the measured poverty is.
We proposed to re-examine a solution to that paradox, which consists of
extending lifetime income proles, to take the "missing poor" into account.
For that purpose, we developed a two-period model with income mobility and
income-di¤erentiated mortality. We identied two conditions under which the
extension of income proles allows head-count poverty ratios to satisfy a weak re-
quirement of independence from survival conditions (No Mobility Same Poverty):
(1) the ctitious income is assigned only to the prematurely dead poor; (2) that
ctitious income does not exceed the income when being alive.
Although those conditions are intuitive, these su¤er from two major draw-
backs. First, condition (1) is not compatible with the idea that a premature
death is a source of poverty for all individuals who face it. Second, condition (2)
does not help us a lot regarding the choice of a particular ctitious income, which
is problematic for empirical applications. Therefore, we proposed to extend the
adjustment to all prematurely dead persons, and to use, as a ctitious income,
the welfare-neutral income, i.e. the income making an individual indi¤erent
between life continuation and death.
Finally, we used regional Belgian data to estimate the size of the Mortality
Paradox, as well as the robustness of adjusted poverty measures to the ctitious
incomes used. We showed that the extension of income proles by means of
ctitious incomes equal to the incomes when being alive leads to a rise of about
1 point of poverty rate at age 60 and more. But once the poverty threshold
is modied to t the adjusted income distribution, the adjusted poverty rate
becomes close to the unadjusted one. We also compute adjusted poverty rates
under welfare-neutral ctitious incomes, and showed that such an alternative
adjustment raises poverty rates by about 6 to 7 points. Hence, while the mere
addition of the "missing" individuals under a constant income leads to a minor
variation in the magnitude of poverty, the monetization of premature death by
means of the welfare-neutral ctitious income raises the magnitude of poverty.
Similar comparisons made on the basis of FGT poverty measures conrmed
those ndings, and showed even larger adjustments, since the assignment of a
welfare-neutral ctitious income to the prematurely dead substantially raises
the depth of the poverty phenomenon, as measured by (squared) poverty gaps.
Those ndings have strong corollaries for policy-making. Suppose that a
government can choose between two policies: on the one hand, a transfer pro-
gram towards the elderly poor; on the other hand, a free access to health care
services below some income level. Undoubtedly, the rst policy would reduce
the standard old-age poverty rate, but the second policy, by increasing the num-
ber of poor persons surviving to the old age, would raise the old-age poverty
measure. Relying on standard poverty measures would thus favor the rst pol-
icy. On the contrary, if one uses adjusted old-age poverty measures, the rst
policy, by focusing on the surviving old, would only reduce poverty to a small
extent, whereas the second policy, by preventing lots of premature deaths, would
strongly reduce the (so-measured) poverty. Thus the way in which poverty is
measured is far from neutral regarding the assessment of social policies.
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Note that the inuence of public policies on the number and identities of
living individuals has been largely discussed in the population ethics literature.24
The specicity of the problem at stake here lies in the fact that such an inuence
is a¤ected by something that appears, at rst glance, to be "neutral": the
poverty indicator that is used. The present paper shows that the precise way in
which poverty measures treat the prematurely dead persons is far from neutral
for policy valuation, and, at the end of the day, for policy-making.
In sum, the comparison of standard poverty rates with adjusted ones re-
veals that the impact of income-di¤erentiated mortality on the measurement of
poverty is far from benign. One should thus be careful when interpreting the
levels and variations of usual old-age poverty measures. Those measures hide
not only a large number of "missing" poor, but, also, a strong form of depriva-
tion: premature death. Thus, two centuries after Malthustreatise, a particular
attention should still be paid to the positive population checks at work in our
economies. Otherwise, if we do as if positive checks do not exist, social statistics
- including the ones on poverty - will be hardly useful for policy-makers.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We want to show that RMC implies NMSP. Let us start from a situation where
all individuals reach the old age. Assuming the absence of mobility, we get: P 2 =
P 1. Consider now a deterioration of survival conditions for some income group.
As poverty rates at the young age do not depend on survival, we get: P 1 = P 10
(as everything else except the deterioration is left unchanged). Moreover, we
have, by RMC, that P 20 = P 2. Hence, by transitivity, we have P 20 = P 2 = P 1 =
P 10. Hence, it follows that, in the absence of income mobility, we have P 10 = P 20,
in conformity with NMSP. Given that any survival conditions can be obtained
by departing from the conditions where everyone survives, we necessarily have,
under RMC, that the poverty rate is constant across the lifecycle in the absence
of mobility, that is, that NMSP holds.
Note that the reverse implication does not hold. NMSP does not necessarily
imply RMC. Actually, NMSP implies RMC only in the case where there is no
income mobility. To see this, take a situation with poverty rate at the young
age equal to P 1. By the NMSP condition, we know that, in the absence of
mobility, we have P 1 = P 2. Take now another situation, with the same poverty
rate at the young age, equal to P 10 = P 1, but with a worsening of the survival
probability for some income level. By the NMSP condition, we know that, in
the absence of mobility, we have P 10 = P 20. But as P 10 = P 1, it follows, by
transitivity of equality, that P 2 = P 20, in conformity with RMC. Thus we have
that NMSP implies RMC in the absence of income mobility. But nothing can
be said on the general case with income mobility.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
By Lemma 1, we can prove that proposition by merely showing that the old-age
poverty rate violates NMSP. NMSP requires that, if no mobility, i.e. ii = 1 for
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all i, poverty at the young age and at the old age should be the same. In the






























Actually, in P 2, low income group numbers receive lower weights than under
P 1 (where the weights are unitary). Hence, it is easy to see that: P 2 < P 1,
which goes against NMSP. By Lemma 1, we also know that P 2 does not satisfy
RMC.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider rst the case where only the initially poor who died prematurely are
assigned a ctitious income. In that case, we have:
 If ei < yP for all i, we have, in the absence of income mobility among



















Thus NMSP is satised.
 If ei < yP for all i < R  P and ei  yP for all i  R, we have, in the



















Hence NMSP is not satised here.

















Thus the adjusted poverty measure does not satisfy NMSP.
Let us now consider the case where a ctitious income level is assigned to
all premature dead persons. We have the following three cases:



















Thus P^ 2 > P 1, because the premature deaths who used to be rich are now

























Hence under a low mortality of the non-poor, the adjusted poverty rate is
close to satisfy NMSP.
 If ei < yP for all i < R  P and ei  yP for all i  R, we have, in the




































Thus NMSP is not satised.
7.4 Proof of Corollary 1



































in conformity with NMSP.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 3












































Thus P^ 2 > P 1, because the premature deaths who used to be rich are now
counted as poor.































Poverty measures Poverty rates are obtained on the basis of the income
data from the european survey EU-SILC. Individuals are taken as the unit of
analysis. The income level assigned to each individual is computed by dividing
the household income level by an equivalence scale. The equivalence scale that
is used is the one of the OECD. That scale assigns a weight of 1 for the rst
adult in the household, a weight of 0.5 for other adults of (14 years or more) in
the household, and a weight of 0.3 for household members less than 14 years-old.
The poverty rate gives the percentage of the population that does not enjoy
an available equivalent income at least equal to 60 % of the median available
equivalent income (median income computed for the country as a whole).
Life tables by income class There are no lifetable by income in Belgium.
However, there exist lifetables by education levels (Deboosere et al, 2009). From
these tables, it is possible to estimate lifetables by income class using a weighted
ordinary least square regression, as in Bossuyt et al (2004) and Van Oyen et al
(2005) studies on health expectancy. Indeed, the position in the social hierarchy
is mainly determined by the dimensions: occupation, income and education.
Given that the income and education are highly related to one another, we can
extrapolate mortality by income class on the basis of the mortality by education.
The social position is determined by the educational attainment. A ve-category
classication is used: (1) no formal education; (2) primary education; (3) lower
secondary education; (4) higher secondary education; (5) tertiary education.
We assume that the position of a socio-economic group is determined by its
relative position, dened as the mid-point of the proportion of group represents
on an ordered scale of 100% (Pamuk, 1985, 1988).
The mortality rates of the educational groups in terms of their relative socio-
economic position is estimated using a weighted ordinary least square region of
each region and sex and (5-year) age group using aggregate data. The weights
are dened as the relative sizes of the educational levels in each age group.
The slope of the regression line represents the di¤erence in mortality between
the bottom and the top of the socio-economic hierarchy. Once estimated, the
coe¢ cient is used to compute lifetable according to income by assuming that
the social hierarchy is similar to education.
In our case, we used lifetables by age groups of ve years in order to obtain
su¢ cient subsample of each income class. Indeed, we consider one hundred
di¤erent groups. Each income class is of 500e except for the highest class
which comprehend all income above 50000e.
29
